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The State CHIP:
How Much Latitude
Do the States Really Have?
The enactment of the Balanced Budget Act (BBA) of
1997 (P.L. 105-33) yielded a major new federal program
to cover low-income, uninsured children—the State
Children’s Health Insurance Program, or CHIP. This
program is generally recognized as the largest new
federal initiative for the uninsured since the enactment
of Medicare and Medicaid in 1965. According to the
Congressional Budget Office (CBO), CHIP has the
potential to cover some 2.8 million children (although
this figure is now regarded by many authorities as low).1
CHIP represents the culmination of several recent
trends. Most directly, it is a legacy of the Clinton
administration’s failed Health Security Act of 1993. In
the wake of that bill’s demise, bipartisan consensus
developed on the need for federal action to at least
reduce the number of uninsured children in the United
States—estimated to total as many as 11 million individuals. Members of Congress from both parties
introduced a number of bills to provide federally funded
coverage for these children. Spurred by the strength of
the economy and the reduction in the federal budget
deficit, after months of partisan jockeying for position,
CHIP emerged with strong bipartisan support last year.
CHIP also reflects recent adjustments in the balance
of power between the federal and state governments,
especially in the policy areas of health and social
welfare. After the fall 1994 elections, when the Republican party regained control of Congress for the first
time in decades, GOP leaders made it clear that they
intended to redress the grievances of the states against
federal grant-in-aid programs, especially welfare and
Medicaid, and return decision-making authority to the
states. A series of block grant proposals ensued, but the
federal-state division of power under Medicaid remained largely untouched by new enactments until the
BBA. (One of the reasons that attempts to convert
Medicaid to a block grant were unsuccessful was the
Clinton administration’s resistance to such broad
devolution of responsibility for Medicaid to the states,
which would have conflicted with its goal of introducing some sort of national health insurance.)
The major devolutionary legislation enacted prior to
CHIP was the Personal Responsibility and Work
Opportunity and Reconciliation Act of 1996 (P.L. 104-

193), the comprehensive federal welfare reform law.
While this measure marked a dramatic break from the
past, ending more than 60 years of individual entitlements to welfare support, its devolution of authority to
the states was marked by a certain degree of ambivalence. On the one hand, the act gave the states broad
discretion in how they manage the new TANF (Temporary Assistance to Needy Families) cash assistance
program, which in many ways resembles a block grant.
On the other hand, it imposed demanding performance
standards on the states with respect to such indicators as
caseload reduction, job placement, and duration of
individuals’ receipt of welfare benefits.
To some extent, the CHIP program carries forward
with this ambivalent devolution. While it appears to
extend far greater discretion to the states than is available under the traditional Medicaid program, it does
stipulate minimum benefits, impose maintenance of
effort requirements, limit the use of cost-sharing devices, such as premiums and copayments, and prohibit
states from using CHIP funds to cover residents who
are eligible for but not enrolled in Medicaid under preCHIP eligibility standards.
Nonetheless, since the BBA was signed into law on
August 5, 1997, all but two states—Alaska and Hawaii—have reached decisions about participating in
CHIP, and 46 states have submitted the plans needed to
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implement CHIP to the Health Care Financing Administration (HCFA). (States have moved forward with
remarkable speed, given that most had to enact enabling
legislation to participate in CHIP as well as develop
comprehensive plans for submission to HCFA.) Thus, it
seems an appropriate time to examine CHIP, especially
in terms of the decisions embodied in the state plans and
their implications for covering uninsured children.
This Forum meeting will explore the degree of
freedom that CHIP affords the states, the factors that
have guided state decision making and planning, and
the reasons the states have arrived at their various
decisions about CHIP. The meeting will focus on state
options in four basic areas:






Whether or not to participate in CHIP.
Whether to expand state Medicaid programs or to
develop or enlarge separate state programs for
uninsured children, using CHIP funding allotments.
Where eligibility levels are set.
How “crowd-out” (the erosion of existing insurance
coverage by CHIP) is being contained.

THE CHIP PROGRAM
The Basic Features of CHIP
In an article published at the beginning of this year,
Sara Rosenbaum and her colleagues at the Center for
Health Policy Research identified some of the key factors
that influenced how the new program is configured:2
CHIP is a reflection of numerous political and policy
themes: health policymakers’ concerns about the
continuing problem of uninsured children . . ; belief
on the part of the Clinton Administration . . . and
Congress that there should be at least some federal
response to the problem of health coverage affordability; states’ strong desire for flexibility in the coverage
of children; child advocates’ demands for minimum
legislative protections; and observers’ concerns about
the “crowd-out” effects of government insurance on
private coverage. . . . The final legislation is an attempt
to blend all of these issues and concerns into one
program; the result is an unusual statute that is far
more complex than it first appears to be.

States are not required to participate in the CHIP
program. (Indeed, there is no mandate that they participate in Medicaid itself and, for many years, Arizona did
not have a Medicaid program.) But, for the first round
of CHIP funding, only four states—Alaska, Hawaii,
Washington and Wyoming—have not yet submitted

CHIP plans. (A fifth, Vermont, withdrew the plan it
initially submitted.) The decision of 45 states and the
District of Columbia to participate in CHIP represents
a tacit acceptance on their part of the terms of state
participation under CHIP.
CHIP offers states the option of covering uninsured
children with family incomes up to 200 percent of the
federal poverty level (FPL), using capped federal funds
with a significantly higher federal matching rate. For
states whose Medicaid eligibility levels already exceed
150 percent of the FPL, eligibility limits under CHIP
may exceed the current Medicaid levels by as much as
50 percentage points. As a result, some states have
chosen CHIP eligibility standards as high as 300
percent of the FPL. (See appendix on page 12 for the
dollar amounts that various percentages of the federal
poverty level represent.) In addition, the CHIP statute
offers the states some latitude in how they define
income for eligibility purposes; in other words, by
disregarding certain specified income, states may make
CHIP benefits available to an even wider population of
children.
The state matching rate under CHIP is 30 percent
less than the historic state Medicaid rate. Thus, if a
state’s current rate is 50 percent under Medicaid, it
drops to 35 percent under CHIP. However, the federal
matching rate for CHIP is capped at 85 percent of total
program costs; thus, state matching requirements range
between 15 and 35 percent (as contrasted with 23 to 50
percent for Medicaid).
CHIP also offers each state a choice of three basic
approaches to structuring its program. It may (a) create
a new or enlarge an existing state children’s health
insurance program, (b) expand its current Medicaid
program by raising eligibility limits, or (c) choose a
combination of the two approaches. If it chooses to
create or enlarge a state program, it can cap or limit
enrollment—so that everyone who meets eligibility
criteria need not be served—but it is required to cover
certain minimum benefits as defined in specified
“benchmark” plans or solicit the approval of the secretary of health and human services for whatever alternative it offers. (The secretary must assure that any
alternative offers comprehensive coverage generally
comparable to benchmark plans.) If a state opts to
operate CHIP as a stand-alone program independent of
Medicaid, it has much greater flexibility to impose
certain eligibility criteria (such as those related to age,
length of residency in the state, and disability status)
than is permitted under the Medicaid program. If it opts
instead to expand Medicaid, it must offer new enrollees
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the same benefits as current Medicaid beneficiaries and
is obligated to cover all children who satisfy its new
eligibility levels; in essence, the state would be augmenting the individual entitlement under Medicaid.
CHIP funds cannot be used to cover children who
are eligible for but not enrolled in Medicaid under the
eligibility provisions a state had in place as of March
31, 1997. Accordingly, children must be screened for
Medicaid eligibility under those pre-CHIP criteria; if
they are found to be eligible under the old Medicaid
standards, they must be enrolled in Medicaid—but at
the lower, non-CHIP federal match rate applicable
under Medicaid. States are also bound by maintenance
of effort requirements, so that, if they opt to expand
Medicaid under CHIP, they may not impose income
and resource eligibility limits more restrictive than
those used as of June 1, 1997. The BBA stipulates that
CHIP is to be the payer of last resort with respect to all
third-party payers, except for the Indian Health Service.
Under CHIP, states may impose cost-sharing requirements in the form of premiums and copayments.
However, if they opt for Medicaid expansion under
CHIP, they are bound by existing Medicaid limits on
cost-sharing, which tend to be fairly restrictive. Yet
there are also limits on the cost-sharing that can be
implemented under a non-Medicaid CHIP program.
Furthermore, any revenues accruing from cost-sharing
must be used to offset or reduce matchable federal
spending under CHIP.
The BBA indicates that CHIP is not meant to be a
new entitlement program for individual children, but
one for the states. (However, if the states opt to expand
Medicaid as their approach to using CHIP funds, they
in effect extend an existing individual entitlement to
more of their residents.) This basic message about the
non-entitlement is reinforced in the funding levels
authorized for the program.
For fiscal year (FY) 1998 through FY 2001, Congress authorized a total of $4.275 billion annually for
CHIP, which declines to $3.150 billion for FY 2002
through FY 2004. Authorized funding rises again to
$4.050 billion in FY 2005 and FY 2006, and $5.000
billion in FY 2007.
The BBA allows individual states to roll over their
allotments for up to two additional fiscal years, to
some extent cushioning the decline in federal funding.
But as Cindy Mann of the Center on Budget and
Policy Priorities pointed out in an analysis published
last fall:

Even without accounting for the effects of health care
inflation and other factors that would be likely to
cause state health care costs to rise over time, the total
amount of funds allocated to states under the child
health block grants will be sliced almost 26 percent in
2002 and remain at that reduced level until 2005.3

It is also important to recognize that, since the
program is not an entitlement, CHIP funding is not
open-ended. The enhanced federal matching rate for
state expenditures under CHIP is available only up to
the limit of the state CHIP allocation. Basically, the
only way that a state may secure additional federal
funding beyond its CHIP allocation is to opt at the
outset for an expansion of its Medicaid program to
cover additional children; under this option, once a
state’s CHIP allotment is exhausted, it may draw down
additional federal funds through the traditional Medicaid program, but at the lower federal matching rate
available under Medicaid.
State CHIP allotments for FY 1998 through FY
2000 are based on the state’s share of the nation’s
uninsured children in families with incomes below 200
percent of poverty, adjusted using a state cost factor
related to average annual wages per employee in the
health services industry. In FY 2001, the allotment
formula shifts to one that weights the number of uninsured children at 75 percent and introduces a simple
count of low-income children, weighted at 25 percent.
Beginning in FY 2002, the formula gives equal weight
(50-50) to the number of low-income uninsured children and the number of low-income children.
As pointed out in a recent memorandum by Patrick
Purcell of the Congressional Research Service, this shift
in the allocation formula has significant regional
implications:4
The distribution of low-income uninsured children and
all low-income children in the United States are very
different. . . . Together, the states in the South and West
accounted for 72% of all uninsured children in the
United States with family incomes of 200% of poverty
or less over the period from 1994 to 1996, while the
Northeast and Midwest had 28% of the nation’s lowincome uninsured children. In contrast, among all
children with family incomes at or below 200% of
poverty, 59% resided in the South and West, while 41%
lived in the states of the Northeast and Midwest. Consequently, when the formula for allocating federal matching funds for S-CHIP begins to change in 2001 . . . more
funds will be allocated to states in the Northeast and
Midwest and fewer federal matching dollars will be
allocated to states in the South and West.

Purcell notes that his conclusion assumes that the
distribution of low-income uninsured and low-income
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children does not change significantly in the interim.
In addition, if CHIP spending itself reduces the
number of low-income uninsured children to a greater
degree in some states than in others, that will also
affect interstate allocations.

Possible Structural Deficiencies in the
BBA’s CHIP Provisions
A recent analysis by Frank Ullman, Brian Bruen,
and John Holahan of the Urban Institute suggested that
if states were able to use the maximum allotments
available to them, about six million children might be
covered under CHIP, yielding a dramatic reduction in
the number of uninsured children.5 The authors identified four major reasons why states will not be able to
realize this full potential:









First, they noted that a significant number of uninsured children in low-income households—between
1.6 million and 4.7 million, depending on the source
of the data—are already eligible for but not enrolled
in Medicaid. The BBA explicitly prohibits the use
of CHIP funds to cover them.
Second, they estimated that there are only 2.9
million uninsured children with family incomes
below 200 percent of the FPL who are actually
eligible for CHIP. An additional 300,000 children
might be covered in states that could offer CHIP
coverage to families with incomes over 200 percent
of the FPL. The authors concluded: “These results
suggest that states could have difficulty spending
their CHIP funds under current program rules.”

The program makes a greater change in incentives to
add coverage in higher-income states than in lowerincome states. The percentage point reductions in state
matching requirements [in comparison to regular
Medicaid matching rates] are greater in a high-income
state than in a low-income state, e.g., greater in
Connecticut than in Mississippi. Low-income states
already had high federal matching rates and the
enhanced matching rates are only slightly
better. . . . Whether they will respond to a small
change in incentives is unclear.

This Urban Institute report evoked an immediate,
strongly worded response from the Children’s Defense
Fund (CDF). In addition to disputing elements of the
methodology used by the Urban Institute researchers,
the CDF response questioned whether the report was
not too narrowly focused on the early years of CHIP,
especially FY 1998. CDF pointed out that CBO had
essentially already reached a similar conclusion about
early underutilization of CHIP funds by the states.
However, CBO noted:6
States will need to manage their programs carefully
and take advantage of the option to roll over part of
any year’s allocation for up to two succeeding years.
But because of the start-up time necessary for states to
develop their programs, submit plans to HCFA, and
have those plans approved, most states will probably
not be able to spend their full allotments for the first
two years of the program anyway. The slow start in
effect provides an automatic cushion for the leaner
years of the program.

Third, they found that about 3.0 million uninsured
children live in families with incomes too high to
qualify for CHIP. They suggested that some of them
might be made eligible if states chose to exclude
part of their families’ income and assets in determining eligibility or if Congress raised CHIP eligibility levels, should a significant amount of CHIP
funds go unused.

CDF went on to declare: “CHIP’s funding formula
is tailored to CHIP’s purpose: covering uninsured
children. CHIP funding levels are highest in the states
with the largest proportion of uninsured children.” It
seems clear that Congress intended to target CHIP
funds to uninsured children, at least in the first years of
the program. Congress also explicitly ruled out substituting CHIP funds for Medicaid, despite the effect this
might have on the “states which couldn’t wait,” but
went on to expand Medicaid prior to CHIP.

Fourth, they questioned the equity of the distribution
of federal funds among the states:

Special Dilemmas for States with
Broad-Based Medicaid Coverage

States that currently have broad levels of coverage
for children will receive fewer federal dollars per
child than if federal funds were allocated simply on
the basis of the state’s share of low-income children. Meanwhile, states that have not already
enacted comprehensive coverage for children get
more federal money per poor child under the CHIP
allocation formula.

They also highlighted a flaw in the CHIP matching
rates:

Nonetheless, developments in three states with
broad-based Medicaid coverage—Minnesota, Vermont,
and Washington—demonstrate the somewhat untoward
effects of the BBA’s CHIP provisions on such states.
Minnesota already has a Section 1115 demonstration
waiver that was implemented in July 1995 and built on
the existing MinnesotaCare program, which covers lowincome, uninsured people. Under the waiver, the state
had already extended Medicaid eligibility to 275
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percent of the FPL and had extended coverage to an
additional 52,000 children and pregnant women. While
CHIP would have allowed the state to extend Medicaid
eligibility to 325 percent of the FPL, Minnesota officials chose instead to extend the eligibility limit from
275 percent of poverty to 280 percent; they apparently
opted for this modest increase so that they could obligate their FY 1998 CHIP allotment. At the same time,
they sought to amend the state’s 1115 waiver to allow
the state to spend more than CHIP allows on administrative and/or planning expenditures (limited to 10
percent of the total state CHIP allotment) as well as to
secure relief from CHIP’s maintenance-of-effort
requirements. The amendment would have allowed the
state to utilize more fully its $28.5 million allotment
under CHIP.
HCFA denied the waiver amendment request, citing
its prior policy guidance to the states that, since CHIP
is a new program, it is not at this stage eligible for
Section 1115 waivers, which are intended to foster new
and innovative demonstration programs. As a result of
HCFA’s interpretation and the state’s seeming unwillingness to choose other alternatives, it is estimated that
Minnesota will be able to extend coverage to fewer than
50 additional children under CHIP.7
Vermont initially submitted to HCFA a CHIP plan
that would have raised eligibility to 300 percent of the
FPL through an expansion of its existing Medicaid
program, which has operated under a Section 1115
waiver implemented on January 1, 1996. (Under the
terms of the waiver, children were already covered in
families with incomes up to 225 percent of poverty.)
However, on August 5, 1998, Gov. Howard Dean
officially withdrew the state’s CHIP application through
a letter to President Clinton, which stated:
SCHIP is designed for states that have done the least
to provide [Medicaid] coverage, and offers no flexibility to states such as Vermont. . . . Vermont will only
experience an annual net gain of $100,000 over the
regular matching rate. To establish a program with
separate administrative and eligibility requirements
for the small number of uninsured children (approximately 1,000) that we can cover under SCHIP is not
cost effective. The added administrative expenses and
systems requirements will more than use up the
incremental increase in federal matching funds available under SCHIP, as compared to using traditional
Medicaid.

Gov. Dean declared the state’s intention to expand
coverage for children to 300% of the FPL through a
Section 1902(r)(2) amendment, bypassing the CHIP
program altogether.

In Washington State, the legislature rejected Democratic Gov. Gary Locke’s proposal to utilize CHIP
funding to expand the Basic Health Plan, the state’s
subsidized insurance plan, from 200 to 250 percent of
the FPL to cover an estimated 10,000 uninsured children. Republican legislative leaders insisted that incomes up to that level—especially in rural and lowercost areas of the state—were too high to merit public
subsidies. Some observers point out that, in the past, the
state never would have left available federal funds of
this magnitude ($47 million for the first year) untapped.
A reporter for State Health Watch noted: “Under the
heading of ‘no good deed goes unpunished,’ one
lobbyist said Washington has been penalized because it
took aggressive steps to insure more of its population
before passage of CHIP.”8

STATE CHIP DECISIONS
Somewhat contrary to expectations, 22 states have
opted to expand their Medicaid programs and 9 states
have chosen to pursue an approach that expands Medicaid and initiates or enlarges a separate state children’s
health program. Only 14 states have decided to escape
the constraints of the Medicaid program altogether by
using CHIP funds for new or existing child health
insurance programs separate from Medicaid.
Given the volume of complaints from the states in
recent years about what they regard as excessive federal
controls over Medicaid and burdensome federal mandates imposed under the program, it may seem surprising that so many states have chosen to use the Medicaid
option under CHIP. But a number of factors help
explain these decisions. Certainly, one factor militating
for Medicaid expansion is that it can be done swiftly
and expeditiously, without the need to develop a
separate CHIP superstructure. In addition, several states
have indicated an intent to move beyond a simple
Medicaid expansion in subsequent iterations of their
CHIP plans and regard their initial choice of Medicaid
expansion as a temporary “place holder” so that they
can lay claim to their FY 1998 CHIP allotment.
Moreover, it is important to recognize that state
decisions about their options under CHIP are governed
to a large extent by factors such as the dimensions of
their existing Medicaid programs, whether they already
have programs other than Medicaid to cover indigent
children, their revenue bases, and whether they have
already availed themselves of Medicaid waiver opportunities. In other words, in implementing CHIP, the states
are not writing on blank slates. They are probably
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therefore likely to weigh the pros and cons of each
alternative under CHIP less fully than some analysts
seem to suggest.

Whether to Participate
As noted above, only three states—Vermont, Washington and Wyoming—have decided not to participate in
CHIP in the first year. As previously explained, the
decisions of Washington not to participate and of Vermont to withdraw its initial CHIP plan are related to the
relative generosity of their Medicaid programs.
Wyoming, on the other hand, offers relatively lowlevel Medicaid coverage but has not chosen to avail
itself of CHIP to expand coverage. Part of the reason
may lie in the fact that the state has the seventh highest
level of state fiscal effort, according to a study conducted by Urban Institute researchers Toby Douglas
and Kimura Flores, who define fiscal effort as “revenue
from state and local taxes divided by state personal
income.”9 Quite simply, given that Wyoming has only
the 35th highest median per capita income in the nation,
while it exerts such a high level of fiscal effort, it may
have simply been beyond the political will or fiscal
capacity of the state to raise additional revenues to draw
down federal matching funds under CHIP.
Action by Congress in May 1998 may lead Washington and Wyoming to rethink their decisions not to
participate in CHIP. In enacting P.L. 105-74, Congress
allowed states to obligate CHIP allocations for FY 1998
by submitting plans before September 30, 1999—the
end of FY 1999. HCFA has received some very preliminary feelers from the two states about possible reconsideration of their CHIP decisions. Alternatively, some
Washington counties may attempt to draw down some
or all of the state’s CHIP allotment if the state itself
fails to do so.

Medicaid Expansion or
Separate State Program?
A number of analysts have looked at the pros and
cons of the three approaches available to a state under
CHIP—(a) create or enlarge a separate state program to
cover uninsured children, (b) expand their Medicaid
program, or (c) adopt a combination of both approaches. In a CHIP implementation guide that it
published last November, the House Committee on
Commerce noted:10
Fundamental to this analysis is a critical question:
which approach—a State-only program or a Medicaid
expansion—will best enable a State to expand cover-

age and services to the largest number of low-income
uninsured children? After all, it was for the purpose of
providing coverage and services to such children that
the S-CHIP was created. . . . From an eligibility
perspective, a State-only S-CHIP program would
enable States to expand coverage to more low-income
uninsured children than would an S-CHIP-financed
Medicaid expansion.

However, this analysis seems based on the premises that
the per capita costs of expanding Medicaid are higher
than the per capita costs of a state-only program and
that the states will extend Medicaid eligibility to cover
a significant number of additional children—both of
which seem rebuttable presumptions.
Coming at the issues from a very different perspective, Mann concluded:
A unified system of covering low- and moderateincome children that builds on the current Medicaid
program will be most likely to reach and enroll
eligible children, take advantage of Medicaid’s
bargaining power and cost-efficiencies, and maximize
available federal funding, thereby assuring the new
child health initiative results in the greatest number of
children receiving comprehensive and affordable
coverage.11

Alan Weil of the Urban Institute has capsulized the
tradeoffs as follows:
The principal reason for states to use new S-CHIP
funds to expand Medicaid is that they can build on an
existing infrastructure. . . . However, states that
expand Medicaid are expanding a program for which
they have long sought more flexibility.12

Regardless of the merits of one approach over
another, certain characteristics of states and their preCHIP Medicaid programs seem to have predisposed
them initially to opt for one approach or another under
CHIP. For example, it might be conjectured that, if a
state already has a separate children’s or family health
insurance program, it is more likely to use CHIP to
build on that program than to expand Medicaid.
According to a May 1997 Alpha Center study
written by Anne Gauthier and Stephen Schrodel, eight
states—California, Colorado, Florida, Massachusetts,
New Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania, and Washington
—already had such programs.13 Three of these states
—Colorado, New York, and Pennsylvania—have
chosen to enlarge their current state programs under
CHIP. Four others—California, Florida, Massachusetts,
and New Jersey—chose to pursue a combination
approach under CHIP. The eighth state with an existing
separate state program, Washington, opted not to
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participate in CHIP. None has opted to expand Medicaid alone.

making its choice of a separate state program largely a
matter of semantics. An additional four states with 1115
waivers—Alabama, Kentucky, Massachusetts, and New
Jersey—chose a combination approach. Two of
these—Massachusetts and New Jersey—already had
separate state programs.

Viewed from another perspective, of the 23 states that
chose either a separate state program or a combination
approach under CHIP, 7 already had separate state
programs for children or families. Thus, only 17 states
chose to develop entirely new state programs under CHIP
and, of these, 9 chose a combination approach, relying in
part on an expansion of their Medicaid programs.

Finally, there appear to be some regional patterns in
the choice of basic approach under CHIP (Table 1). Of
the 12 states in the Midwest, all but 2 have chosen
Medicaid expansions. Of the nine states in the Northeast, five have opted for a combination approach. Of the
13 states in the West, 2 have opted not to participate; of
the remaining 11, 6 have chosen the separate state
program route. Of the 16 states in the South, 9 have
opted to expand Medicaid using CHIP funds.

Another seemingly predisposing factor under CHIP
is whether a state already has a Section 1115 demonstration waiver for its Medicaid program. It might be
posited that if a state already has an 1115 waiver, it
has been afforded a great deal more flexibility than it
would have if it operates a more conventional Medicaid program and, thus, might be more inclined to
expand its Medicaid program under CHIP than to opt
for a separate state program. According to data from
HCFA, 17 states currently have operational Medicaid
1115 demonstrations.14

Choice of Eligibility Level
As mentioned previously, states have chosen CHIP
eligibility levels that range between 100 percent and
300 percent of the FPL. Thirteen states and the District
of Columbia have set their CHIP eligibility levels at
exactly the 200 percent of the FPL that is generally
allowed. Eight states that had Medicaid eligibility limits
above 150 percent of the FPL before CHIP’s enactment
have set CHIP eligibility levels above 200 percent,
three of them—Connecticut, Missouri, and New
Hampshire—at 300 percent. Twenty-three states have
opted for eligibility levels below 200 percent, five of
them—Alabama, Arkansas, Mississippi, North Dakota,
and Texas—at 100 percent.

Of these 1115 waiver states, seven—Arkansas,
Maryland, Minnesota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Rhode Island,
and Tennessee—have chosen to expand their Medicaid
programs under CHIP. (An eighth, Vermont, will
apparently expand Medicaid without participating in
CHIP.) Only four—Arizona, Delaware, New York, and
Oregon—opted to pursue a separate state program
approach; New York already has a separate state
program, and Arizona’s AHCCCS program is considered by some to be a non-Medicaid program, possibly

Table 1
Type of CHIP Program, by Region
Region

No. of
States

Medicaid
Expansion

Combination

State
Program

No CHIP
Program

Not Yet
Submitted

Midwest

12

10

0

2

0

0

Northeast

9

1

5

2

1

0

South

16

9

3

4

0

0

West

13

2

1

6

2

2

Totals

50

22

9

14

3

2

Note: Regions are those defined by the U.S. Bureau of the Census.
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It might be hypothesized that the state’s median per
capita income would have some influence on its choice
of eligibility level under CHIP, since to some degree,
per capita income reflects the fiscal capacity of the
states. If the state’s choices of eligibility level are
ranked by quintile according to their median per capita
income, the distribution shown in Table 2 occurs.

Table 2
States’ Choices of Eligibility Levels under CHIP,
Ranked by Per Capita Income Quintile
Quintile

>200%
FPL

200%
FPL

<200% Unknown or
FPL Not in CHIP

Highest

4

5

1

0

2nd

2

2

3

3

3rd

1

2

6

1

4th

0

2

6

2

Lowest

1

2

7

0

While there is not a precise, straight-line relationship
between state median income and choice of CHIP
eligibility level, there appears to be a pattern in which
those states with higher median incomes generally have
opted for higher eligibility levels and those with lower
per capita incomes generally have opted for lower
eligibility levels.
There are also regional patterns in the choice of
CHIP eligibility levels. Of the eight states with eligibility limits greater than 200 percent of poverty, five are in
the Northeast. Of the 23 states that have chosen eligibility limits lower than 200 percent, 9 are in the South and
7 are in the Midwest.15

Containing Crowd-Out
One of the major concerns of Congress in enacting
CHIP was to assure that it does not supplant—or
“crowd out”—existing insurance coverage for the
eligible population. Accordingly, the BBA limits CHIP
coverage to children without other forms of “creditable
coverage,” as defined in the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) of 1996. States
have an affirmative obligation to assure that children
with existing coverage are not enrolled in CHIP.

In their CHIP plans, states have taken a variety of
approaches in addressing crowd-out. According to HCFA
data on the 23 state plans approved through mid-July, the
most common approach is some kind of waiting period
prior to CHIP coverage, an option chosen by 11 states; for
most of these states, the period is either three months or
six months. (New Jersey imposes a 12-month waiting
period. After initially imposing a six-month wait, North
Carolina will eventually phase in a 60-day waiting
period.) Eight states have made no explicit provision for
crowd-out in their plans, suggesting that they will monitor
developments and take appropriate action if a significant
problem materializes. A number of states will subsidize or
supplement existing employer coverage as a means of
limiting erosion of private coverage and thereby reducing
crowd-out.
The crowd-out issue is one that has caused a great
deal of concern to both fiscal conservatives and advocates for the poor. Conservatives point out that, given
the limited funds available through CHIP, if subsidies
are used by people who are already insured, the capacity of the program to reduce the number of uninsured
children will be compromised. Some say that allowing
people who are already insured to enroll in CHIP might
also skew participation in favor of this population and
away from the generally lower-income uninsured.
On the other hand, advocates for the poor contend
that some degree of crowd-out is inevitable in a
program like CHIP and express concern that the more
rigorously measures to prevent crowd-out are enforced, the more likely they are to impede CHIP
participation and undermine the ability of the program
to reach the maximal number of uninsured children.
Larry Levitt and Judith Feder, in a paper the Kaiser
Family Foundation issued earlier this year, raised
some related concerns:16
It is important to recognize that currently insured low
income families who choose to take advantage of new
coverage opportunities do so because it gives them
financial relief or better coverage. This relief seems at
least as legitimate as the relief recent legislation has
provided self-employed families through tax preferences (with no evidence of expanded coverage).
Further, denying one group of low income families a
benefit awarded to others of similar income seems
unfair, especially if the insurance coverage they have
entails substantial financial sacrifice.

Thus, while both sides of the crowd-out debate seem
to share a basic concern about covering as many children
as possible, they seem to differ fundamentally about the
desirability of preventing crowd-out from occurring.
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THE FORUM SESSION
This Forum session will address many of the following issues:














Does the CHIP program truly offer states broad
discretion in configuring their approaches to serving
uninsured children, or are they necessarily heavily
constrained by the shape of their existing Medicaid
programs and other factors?
Does CHIP unfairly penalize states that have already taken the initiative to cover a large number of
uninsured children? Or is this an inevitable result of
targeting currently uninsured children and gearing
CHIP to states without the resources to finance their
own programs?
To what extent are concerns about crowd-out
because of CHIP legitimate? Is some degree of
crowd-out inevitable with any such new public
initiative? Does preventing or limiting crowd-out
necessarily mean reducing the effectiveness of such
an initiative in reaching the greatest possible number of uninsured children?
Will the states be able to avail themselves fully of
CHIP funding to reduce the number of uninsured
children to the maximum degree possible? If not,
does the BBA contain inherent obstacles that will
impede their covering the highest number of children?
Was the intent of Congress in enacting CHIP to
extend coverage to the maximum number of uninsured children or to target funds to provide broad
coverage to the neediest children? In this regard,
what are the implications for state choice of the
Medicaid expansion versus separate state program
options under CHIP?
How should CHIP influence future Section 1115
demonstration grants? The continuation of current
grants?
Given the extensive variation that appears to be
taking place among state CHIP programs, are the
data reporting and collection systems in place or
being developed to monitor and evaluate the program adequately from the federal level?

CHIP as well as some general observations about the
CHIP plans that have been submitted to HCFA and the
options the states are choosing.
She will be followed by four state officials who have
played a major role in the implementation and management of CHIP in their states: Barbara Ladon, director
of the Office of Program Development of the Colorado
Department of Health Care Policy and Financing;
Sandra Shewry, executive director of the California
Managed Risk Medical Insurance Board; Greg Vadner, director of the Division of Medical Services in the
Missouri Department of Social Services; and Gwendolyn Williams, commissioner of the Alabama Medicaid
Agency. They will talk about how CHIP is configured
in each of their states, the planning and decisionmaking process that produced their CHIP plans, the
politics of CHIP in their states, and what they perceive
to be the strengths and weaknesses of CHIP statute and
regulations.
Following their presentations, Ms. Chang will
respond to their remarks before a general discussion
between the audience and the panel.
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APPENDIX
States have opted for CHIP eligibility levels between
100 and 300 percent of the FPL, and CHIP allows most
states to choose eligibility limits up to 200 percent. For

1998, these percentages of the poverty guidelines for
the 48 contiguous states translate into the following
figures:

Multiples of 1998 DHHS Poverty Guidelines
Size of Family Unit

100%

200%

300%

1

$8,050

$16,100

$24,150

2

$10,850

$21,700

$32,550

3

$13,650

$27,300

$40,950

4

$16,450

$32,900

$49,350

5

$19,250

$38,500

$57,750

6

$22,050

$44,100

$66,150

7

$24,850

$49,700

$74,550

8

$27,650

$55,300

$82,950

For each additional person, add

$2,800

$5,600

$8,400

Note: Separate poverty guidelines are established for Alaska and Hawaii. Alaska levels are about 25 percent higher than the levels
for the contiguous states, while those for Hawaii are about 15 percent higher than those for the continental United States.

